

File as S-2280

(Today's Briefing to SecDef)

Developments in the Ground  
War in So. Vietnam

2280

COMMUNIST LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS IN I CORPS

The requirements for the Communist forces in I Corps, RVN, are as follows:

<u>Class of Supply</u>	<u>Internal</u>	<u>External</u>	<u>Total</u>
I Food	1.02	.64	1.66
II & IV	.231	.100	.331
V Ammunition*	.008	.025	.033
 Total	1.26	.76	2.02

\*The external ammunition requirement for I Corps has been raised from the overall requirement for Communist forces in South Vietnam by a factor of 1.6. This factor is the approximate difference in the rate of combat between I Corps and the rest of the country as measured by captured reports of frequency of engagement and by statistics on reported numbers of attacks. The factor was applied in total to the external requirement due to the extremely high percentage of Communist Chinese weapons in I Corps.

The strength of the Communist forces in I Corps, South Vietnam is as follows:

26,130 Combat Troops  
27,450 Irregulars  
 Total 53,580

The total daily requirements for the Communist forces are, therefore:

Short Tons

<u>Class of Supply</u>	<u>Internal</u>	<u>External</u>	<u>Total</u>
I Food	13.3**	8.3**	21.6
II & IV	6.2	2.7	8.9
V Ammunition	.2	.7	.9
	<u>19.7</u>	<u>11.7</u>	<u>31.4</u>

\*\*External and internal logistics requirements have not been applied to the irregular forces under the assumption that these troops procure their food principally through their own devices and thus do not place a load on the Communist logistics system.

Sea Infiltration

Two recent returnee reports indicate significant amounts of supplies are infiltrated to I Corps by sea. One indicator<sup>s</sup> supplies are received "frequently" by sea, and are transported by <sup>coolie</sup> ~~rookie~~ labor groups to western Quang Ngai province. The other, [REDACTED] stated that in 1965 and 1966, 50% of supplies came by sea, but that this percentage had been reduced this year to a range of 20-30 percent. Supplies were off-loaded at ports of entry along the Quang Mgai coast, and transported to a primary resupply area in the Quang Mgai-Kontum border area. Of three attempts by trawlers to infiltrate supplies <sup>in 1966</sup> ~~this~~ year, only one had been successful.

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One trawler detected and beached in March 1967 by Market Time Operation, contained claymore mines, blasting caps, and explosives, rifles (18 bolt action and 300 K-44), two machine guns, a radio, blood plasma and assorted medical supplies. Total weight of these supplies came to a minimum of 6 tons. Total capacity of the vessel, and whether all the contraband material was captured, is unknown. While the capacity of the motorized sampans is unknown, it is likely that a minimum figure of one ton would be appropriate.

II. The Movement of Supplies

The external supply requirements of the Communist forces in I Corps, South Vietnam are met entirely by flows from North Vietnam. An exhaustive study of captured documents and interrogation reports has revealed no meaningful flow of material from II Corps, and the reports of defectors and POW's indicate a shortage of rice on the routes from Laos to I Corps areas.

The flows from North Vietnam are believed to be presently concentrated in trails across the DMZ and vessel traffic to ~~Quang Trí~~ the coastal areas of I Corps. This pattern is likely to be ~~now~~ modified substantially, however, with the completion of a motorable road through Laos into Thua Thien. ~~Afterwards~~

The relatively small daily ~~throughput~~ external logistics requirement of 11.7 tons could readily be handled by either the trails or the sea routes. Based on past observations of sea infiltration attempts, however, it is likely that little, if any, rice is carried by this method. As such, given a minimum cargo carrying capacity of .5 tons for the coastal vessels, fewer than seven sampans per day would be required to provide an adequate flow of supplies other than food. Alternatively, one or two large trawlers per week could perform with equal facility.

770  
Class I - Food

I Corps is a rice deficit area. Estimated rice production in 1966 was 209,000 tons while estimated civilian consumption was 366,000 tons -- in 1966, a deficit of 157,000 tons. This deficit was made up by US imports and SVN-sponsored rice shipments from the rice surplus delta area south of Saigon. Because of this general shortage, enemy forces in the area are partially dependent on out-of-country sources of supply for food.

130  
130/130

intelligence P5 report/allowances for expenses indicate  
average daily ration obtained from analysis of captured Army  
documents

Presently, there are approximately 10,000  
enemy troops operating

in the Quang Tri area.

(INSERT 1)

<del>Unit</del>	<del>Strength</del>	<del>Rice per day</del>	<del>Rice Requirements</del>
			(tons/1000 per month)
341st NVA	7,500	1.33	187
324B NVA	7,740	1.33	193
325th NVA	10,000	1.33	249
Total	25,240		629

the Quang Tri area

Units operating in ~~this area~~ are believed to receive

virtually their entire rice supply from North

Vietnam. Rice receipts from rear service

elements of the 324B NVA Division captured

during Operation Hastings indicate that all rice

come across the DMZ.<sup>11</sup> Other reports detail the use of

bicycles, laborers, and NVA soldiers to move large

quantities - up to 165 tons at a time - across the

Per Nai River. North Vietnamese units which

Insert 1

Based on an analysis of captured enemy documents from this area, enemy forces require an estimated 1.33 pounds per man per day of food. Monthly requirements for the forces operating in the <sup>then</sup> Derong Tri area would be approximately 250 tons per month, including a 25 percent allowance for wastage and storage losses.

(2)

are nearly infiltrated or operating continually  
across the DMZ  
along the DMZ area must rely on internal  
sources of food supply because the ~~sovereign~~ Viet Cong  
infrastructure in this area does not have the  
tax, purchase, steal, and store  
capability to gather and transport enough rice  
for so large an enemy force.

Enemy troops operating in other areas of  
I Corps are believed to obtain their Class I  
requirements from the local economy.

(3)

An estimated 16,130 enemy troops are operating in other areas of I Corps. These forces require approximately 400 tons of rice per month, again including a 25 percent allowance for wastage and storage losses. These forces are believed to obtain their food from the local economy. Rear service groups <sup>and</sup> finance and economy sections procure the food by means of agricultural and other taxes, purchases from peasants, peasant purchases in GVN-controlled areas, and possibly a small amount of infiltration across the border from Laos. It is unlikely, however, that much rice comes into I Corps through Laos - serious shortages have been reported by infiltrators passing


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down fraction trials.

**SECRET**General Logistic Situation

1. During 1966 we estimated that the Communist forces in South Vietnam had only a small difference on external forces for logistic supplies, the last NIE on the subject expressed this requirement as 20-30 tons a day. The success of allied ground operations has had a measurable impact on the problems forced on the Communist forces in maintaining the logistics supply of their forces. This has been most noticeable in regard to food supply. Allied operations have disrupted food supply to the extent that out-of-country sources must now supply one-third of the enemy's rice requirements.

2. The dependence on external food supplies is confined for the most part to I Corps and to the seven northern provinces in II <sup>and</sup> Corps. Almost one-half of the estimated 12,000 tons a year of rice required by the regular forces in I Corps comes from outside the country. With something in the order of one-half of the main forces located in Quang Tri Province. Most of this rice has been infiltrated across the DMZ along the Ben Hai River. The remaining forces apparently are able to get their requirements through taxation and purchase from the local economy. We estimate that only a small amount comes through Laos. The rice deficit areas in II and III Corps support something in the order of 30,000 regular forces in seven provinces from Kontum to Binh Long. These forces are overwhelmingly NVA troops, and food requirements amount to 40 percent of the areas production.

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
Rice for these forces is infiltrated from Cambodia. We estimate that probably 20,000 tons and maybe as much as 30,000 tons of rice were supplied to Communist forces from Cambodia during 1966. A good part of this rice was also used to feed the NVA/Pathet Lao and forces in Laos/~~km~~ the thousands of construction workers and other labor maintaining the logistics drain.

-2-

**SECRET**

Impact of the Build-up in I Corps

1. If the NVA forces now in the DMZ or north of it move into I Corps, we could assume that from 25,000 to 35,000 additional troops would have to be resupplied. In terms of food alone this could be as high as 30 tons a day, an added burden more than tripled the current flow. This would present severe logistic problems in terms of porters; a very rough guess indicates that as many as 10,000 would be required. In this context, the new road connections acquire an added importance since movement by trucks would require only 7-8 trucks per day.




Road Construction

1. Since November 1966, the end of the last rainy season, the North Vietnamese have been busy constructing, repairing, and improving the road network. The entire road network in the Laos Panhandle was reopened to through traffic via Routes 92 and 96 by the first week of January 1967.

2. For the first time a motorable road has been constructed which extends into South Vietnam. This is Route 922 which extends across the border into the Ashau Valley in Quang Tri Province. This extension was built in approximately 4 months and is approximately 50 miles long; it probably required some 15,000 laborers.

3. Construction has also begun on Route 92 to link it with Route 103 which goes around the IMZ. We estimate this road could be completed in 30-60 days. It will be the first motorable link between the IMZ area and the area of Laos and around Route 9.

4. During the past 3 years, the road network through Laos has been increased from 150 miles to 730 miles with some indication of the current effort being placed on the new road construction this year is the fact that the labor force has probably doubled from 2,000 to 4,000 workers and heavy construction equipment is being used to build these roads.

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Construction of New Roads in the Laos Panhandle  
 January 1964 - March 1967

		<u>Number of Months</u>	<u>Addition</u>	<u>Miles Per Months</u>
Jan 64 - Jan 65		12	Neg.	Neg.
Feb 65 - Mar 65	Day	2	60	30
April 65 - Aug 65	Wet	5	25	5
Sept 65 - Dec 65	Day	4	160	40
Jan 66 - Mar 66	Day	3	255	85
April 66 - Aug 66	Wet	5	30	6
Sept 66 - Oct 66	Day (wet in w)	2	Neg.	Neg.
Nov 66 - Mar 67	Day	5	50	10

Infiltration of Supplies

1. Despite the bombing program our knowledge of truck movements through Laos indicate that the Communist are again increasing the volume of supplies moved into the panhandle as they did last year. During the current dry season, the Communist have been able to use the major routes for traffic -- Route 15 through the Mu Gia Pass and Route 912. The flow of supplies began earlier this year and larger trucks are being used.

2. We have almost no knowledge of movement on Route 912 but know from aerial observers and photography that it is being used by trucks. On the route through Mu Gia Pass alone, more than 20 trucks per day are moving on the average compared to the 28 trucks of 1965 when Mu Gia was the only access. We also feel that larger trucks are being used this year and estimate that at least 20,000 tons will go into Laos compared to 17,000 last year and 7,000 in 1965. We have no firm fix on how much of this moves into South Vietnam but presume that most of it is for consumption in Laos. Movements south of the Mu Gia Pass have been at a relatively low level suggesting that the stocks are being stockpiled for movement later in the season.

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Class I -- Food

Allied operations have disrupted food supply so that out-of-country sources must supply one-third of the enemy's rice requirements -- e.g., 27,000 tons of which 22,000 tons are required from Cambodia.

I Corps with order of battle of 39,370 troops has a requirement yearly of 9,600 tons (26 tons/day). When adjusted for spoilage, damage, etc. this requirement is 12,000 tons or 30 tons/day.

I Corps--Rice

Production -- 1966, 209,000 tons

Consumption -- 366,000 tons (2.8 million people)

Deficit = 157,000 tons

Made-up by US imports and GVN sponsored rice shipments.

With 1/2 of main force located in Quang Tri province they and newly infiltrated units receive their rice across the DMZ and along the Ben Hai River--some 51,000 tons a year.

The remaining forces are supplied their requirement -- 7,000 tons -- through taxation, purchase, and only a small amount through Laos.

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Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

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II and III Corps -- from 7 provinces Kontum to Binh Long

OB overwhelmingly NVA

II Corps -- 24,000

III Corps -- 7,000

This (and the DMZ) is the only area where enemy can't feed  
off the land.

Production -- 26,450 tons

Consumption -- 93,500 tons (pop. 731,000)

Requirement OB


II Corps -- 7,400 tons

III Corps -- 3,000 tons

10,400 = 40% of area's prod.

Some 22,000 tons came in from Cambodia.

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~~SECRET~~Food -- Remaining AreasII and III Corps

Can live off the land.

Only localised shortage noticed was in Binh Dinh during intense allied operation. None ever noted in III Corps.

	<u>OB</u>	<u>Rice</u>
II	25,000	7,800
III	<u>40,000</u>	<u>17,200</u>
	65,000	25,000

Production in area = 569,000 tons

Enemy Requirements = 4.4% of production

IV Corps

Production 2,060 million tons

Main Force OB = 20,000 tons

Rice Requirement = 9,400 tons

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1. Trends in Construction of Roads in the Area of the DMZ

The North Vietnamese resumed construction, repair, and improvement of the road network in the area of the DMZ in November 1966, following the end of the last rainy season. The main effort since November has been directed toward upgrading the existing system which was completed during the previous year. The entire road system in the Laos Panhandle, which was rapidly expanded during the 1966 dry season (see the table), was reopened to through traffic via routes 92 and 96 by the first week of January 1967. Roads through Mu Gia Pass are serviceable and route 23 is now being used along with 911 to the Tchepone area. Although the alternate border crossing from North Vietnam via route 912 was kept open during the past rainy season, it appears that Mu Gia Pass is also being used again.

2. Significant New Construction of Roads

The North Vietnamese, for the first time, have recently constructed a motorable road from the Ho Chi Minh Trail extending into South Vietnam. Route 922 through the Se La Mang River Valley has been extended across the border into the Ashau Valley in Quang Tri Province. This extension, which was built in approximately four months, is about 50 statute miles in length (see the attached maps).

Construction also has begun on an extension of Laos route 92 north from route 9, toward the Se Bang Hieng River Valley which crosses the Laos/Vietnam border at the DMZ. The connecting link will be about 30 miles in length and will connect the North Vietnam road and trail network near the DMZ with Thua Thien Province, South Vietnam. It could be completed in 30--60 days. Although a complex network of trails -- at least one of which was extensively improved -- has connected the Laos route 9 area with the DMZ since 1965, -- this is the first indication of an intention to construct a motorable link between these two points.

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3. Inputs

In early 1967 there were an estimated 2,000 workers deployed in the vicinity of routes 922 and 92. This labor force has probably been increased to 3,000 or 4,000 workers. In addition, road-watch teams report that some heavy construction equipment is being used in construction of the new roads.

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## 8. Probable Insurgent Encampments, Stoeng-Takev (River), Cambodia

A concentration of probable insurgent activity is located in Cambodia along the Stoeng Takev (river) in the vicinity of 10-50N 105-01E, adjacent to the Cambodia/South Vietnam Border and approximately 17.5 nm southeast of Takeo.

Probable insurgent encampments are located [REDACTED] (at least 20 partially concealed buildings) and [REDACTED] (at least 15 partially concealed buildings). Numerous trails extending east from the latter area cross the the Cambodia/South Vietnam Border and terminate in South Vietnam at an unnamed village on the Song Chau Doc (river) [REDACTED]

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
An abandoned Cambodian strongpoint is located on the Stoeng Takev between the two probable insurgent encampments. Although active military facilities are located both upstream and downstream, there appears to be an absence of military control in the immediate vicinity of the probable insurgent activity.

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[REDACTED] 25X1C

25X1C



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## 3. POL Storage Area, Route 922, Laos

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A POL storage area is located immediately east of Route 922 at 16-16N 106-57E [REDACTED] Thirty-three POL drums, probably 55-gallon capacity, are partially buried in three trench-type excavations and an additional 34 drums are scattered in the vicinity (Figure 12). Soil in the heavily cratered area probably facilitates the burying process. A probable camouflaged truck was observed parked in the tree line near the storage site on 15 Mar 67. (See map, page 15.)

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